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1 Introduction
Imagining, establishing and instituting 
peace
E. P. Moloney and Michael Stuart Williams
Attitudes towards peace in the classical world have for many been summed 
up by two famous sayings, one Greek and one Roman. There is apparent 
confirmation that the world of classical Greece was endlessly fractious in the 
observation of the philosopher Heraclitus that ‘war is both father of all and 
king of all’, and it is no accident that the phrase is used in the title of a col-
lection of essays on war both ancient and modern by the historian Victor 
Davis Hanson.1 Roman attitudes, meanwhile, are often taken to be repre-
sented by the adage derived from the military writer Vegetius: ‘if you want 
peace, prepare for war’ – a slogan taken up with enthusiasm since, not least 
as an argument for nuclear deterrence.2 Certainly, the modern image of the 
classical world is one of conflict and war, from the Greek and Persian warriors 
of Troy and 300 to the Roman armies and gladiatorial combats of Cleopatra, 
Gladiator and the television series Rome.3 Armchair strategists have endlessly 
fought and refought the greatest battles of the classical era, from board games 
recreating the battles of Gaugamela or Alesia to contemporary video games 
such as Rome: Total War, and enthusiasts can even avail of a bi-monthly print 
magazine.4 Museums regularly provide exhibits on ancient warfare and the 
classical world is well represented in military museums in Athens, Paris and at 
Vindolanda, among others.5 Ancient and classical warfare are also a frequent 
focus of modern scholarship, with recent publications ranging from a ‘very 
short introduction’ published by Oxford University Press to a two-volume 
Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare; while, since 2013, scholarly 
activity has supported an annual International Ancient Warfare Conference.6 
Of course, much of this emphasis can be easily explained by the nature of 
scholarly materials: sophisticated warfare requires specialist equipment that 
leaves traces in the archaeological record; and our written evidence from 
Homer’s Iliad to Gregory of Tours’ History of the Franks and beyond is no less 
preoccupied with recounting war and conflict.7
Yet, the emphasis on conflict and war in our written evidence may allow 
us to approach an element bound up with them but that has received remark-
ably little independent attention: peace, and the associated ideas of conflict 
resolution and reconciliation. The modern discipline of Peace Studies can be 
traced without too much debate to the founding in 1964 of the International 
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Peace Research Association and the Journal of Peace Research. As a discipline 
grounded primarily in sociology and political theory it is heavily focused 
on policy and advocacy, but it also insists on an interdisciplinary approach 
incorporating the close analysis and use of historical examples. Nevertheless, 
scholars working in the discipline have paid relatively little attention to the 
classical world.8 The one area of discussion into which classical precedents 
have consistently been brought is the controversy over ‘democratic peace’, 
which examines the question of whether democratic states consistently avoid 
war with one another: classical Athens has been put forward as an emblematic 
democracy whose actions may qualify the argument.9 Even here, it is evident 
that the primary interest of scholars in peace studies remains modern democ-
racies; all the same, classical scholars have begun to take an interest in the 
debate and to draw attention to some of the complexities of the relationship 
that existed in Athens between democratic ideology and military ventures.10 
A fuller sense of the historical conditions and attitudes that pertained in the 
ancient world can only be to the advantage of those seeking to use classical 
precedents to contemporary ends.
It is, of course, the case that classical scholars have long studied not only 
war but also aspects of peacemaking: detailed studies have been made of truces 
and leagues and other legal and institutional manifestations of the desire to 
make and maintain a peaceful coexistence with others.11 Similarly, there has 
been a long tradition of investigation into the causes of ancient wars, much of 
it prompted by the meditations on that topic by the historian Thucydides.12 
Yet, peace in the classical world has rarely been an object of sustained study 
in its own right: the most valuable recent contribution, a 2007 volume edited 
by Kurt Raaflaub on War and Peace in the Ancient World, not only extends 
its reach far beyond classical Greece and Rome but also betrays in its title 
its conception of peace as an adjunct to war.13 Although the contributors to 
Raaflaub’s volume are all careful to allow peace at least as much considera-
tion as warfare, the insistent coupling of the two concepts implies both that 
‘peace’ is a concept that applies chiefly (if not only) to international or inter-
state relations and that it can be defined as the cessation or the absence of a 
formal state of war. This is not wholly misleading, but it is insufficient: it is to 
ignore a variety of common understandings of peace, and especially of conflict 
resolution and reconciliation, that existed in the classical world even outside 
the context of warfare as such. While a full study of peace in all its aspects is 
beyond the scope of a single volume, and although war can by no means be 
excluded from the discussion, it is the hope that by making peace alone the 
centre of attention it will be possible to acquire a broader and more inclusive 
understanding of its place and its value in the classical world.14
There remains, of course, the difficulty of defining what exactly is meant by 
‘peace’. Modern scholars have often preferred to define it very broadly in terms 
of the absence of ‘violence’, which is itself susceptible to very broad definition. 
In some cases, as in the model promoted by Johan Galtung, this can extend 
to defining as violent – and so lacking peace – any situation in which there is 
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either restraint on an individual’s potential or any structural social injustice.15 
This understanding has been influential but also much criticised, not least for its 
tendency to confound peace with freedom and justice, which are better under-
stood as separate but related ideas: peace can exist without justice, and justice 
without peace.16 Certainly, it is necessary in the discussion of the classical world 
to uncouple peace from an ideal of social justice, since the manifestly unjust 
treatment of women and slaves (among others) would in these terms disqualify 
the majority of classical societies from ever being peaceful. As Harald Müller 
has suggested, it is perhaps better to maintain a more restricted understanding 
of peace as an unexceptional state in which there is neither the open use of 
violence between identifiable groups nor the definite threat of such violence.17 
Moreover, since ‘violence’ has become a term of art and is increasingly taken 
to include broader forms of ‘cultural’ and ‘structural’ violence, it is often pref-
erable to use an alternative term such as ‘conflict’ as a foil for the understanding 
of peace.18
Ultimately, however, there has been no effort to impose upon contributors 
to this volume a common vocabulary or theoretical approach. Not the least 
advantage in studying the classical world is the extent to which its assumptions 
depart from our own; and ‘peace’ is not to be so strictly defined when part of 
the purpose of the investigation is to emphasise the fit or the lack of it between 
modern definitions of peace and the classical understanding of eirene or pax.19 
It is for these reasons that the contributions to this volume have been divided 
into three parts: imagining, establishing, and instituting peace. Even though 
this scheme is imposed from without, and even though some contributions 
necessarily overstep the boundaries it creates, it has been chosen as reflecting 
three distinct aspects of peace as it appears in the study of the classical world: in 
modern terms, they might be taken as corresponding respectively to peace as 
such, to conflict resolution, and to reconciliation. Within each part the contri-
butions are then offered in chronological order.
The first part examines the idea and ideology of peace in the classical 
world, and it makes clear that peace was a matter of concern not only to 
philosophers but also to politicians, poets, comedians: essentially, to anyone 
with an interest in the interpretation and reinterpretation of contempo-
rary culture. William Allan thus begins with a detailed investigation of the 
language of the great Athenian poet and politician Solon, whose public 
rhetoric is shown to make heavy use of the language of military conflict as 
a means of raising the stakes of internal disputes – and, Allan argues, as a 
means of establishing his own role as a ‘reconciler’ and peacemaker. Solon’s 
political poetry gives pride of place to eunomia (translatable perhaps as ‘good 
order’): combined with his other imagery it conjures up a (semi-divine) 
figure capable of transcending petty squabbles and protecting the common 
interest of the population as a whole. A similar focus on common interests 
and values, and a similar emphasis not on eirene but on a related concept, is 
also to be found in William Desmond’s discussion of ideas of peace as they 
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appear in Aristotle’s more abstract philosophical speculations: although, in 
fact, Aristotle emerges as very much concerned with the practical conditions 
under which a future peace might flourish. Desmond points in particular 
to the significance of philia, which is to say a form of friendship that might 
be extended to serve as the basis for an ideal community, ultimately (as in 
Solon) transcending the political and social divisions to which humans for 
the present were prey.
The comic playwright Aristophanes was equally preoccupied with the 
balance between an idealised state of peace and justice and the divisions and 
violence he saw all around him; and as Ian Ruffell argues in his contribution 
to this volume, his solutions – driven to a large extent by the need to amuse as 
well as engage his audience – often struggled to reconcile advocacy for peace 
and peacemaking with a commitment to satire and blame directed at warmon-
gers and (ostensibly self-interested) peacemakers alike. ‘Irony’s guns face in 
every direction’, it has been said, and Aristophanes was too much the ironist to 
be willing to disarm unilaterally in a political cause.20 Yet, Ruffell notes, too, an 
awareness in Aristophanes of the differences between concluding a truce and 
establishing (or instituting) peace; and it is perhaps telling that even the separate 
peace obtained by Dikaiopolis, the justly-named protagonist of Akharnians, is 
no more than a thirty-year truce.
Similar considerations also animate the investigation conducted by 
Benjamin Gray into the complex relationship between eirene and homonoia, 
which may be broadly conceived of as opposites to external war (polemos) and 
internal strife (stasis) respectively. Gray traces a move from homonoia under-
stood as a form of commonality and unity which might as easily promote 
factional conflict as restrain it, towards an approach in the Greek cities that 
concentrated on the suppression of dissent under the banner of a common 
humanity and commitment to tolerance. This transference of the conditions 
of inter-state peace – which very often means no more than co-existence – 
to the internal politics of a city is also recognisable, as Gray himself notes, 
in Hannah Cornwell’s contribution to this volume, in which she examines 
the changing terminology of pax (peace) and concordia (concord) in the later 
Roman republic. Here too we see a deliberate blurring of the traditional 
distinction in the rhetoric adopted in particular by Cicero, who was deter-
mined to portray as an existential threat to the Roman state the actions of 
Julius Caesar and Mark Antony, whose own preference was instead to present 
themselves as conducting politics as usual. As Cornwell notes, this shift in 
vocabulary laid the ground for Caesar’s great-nephew Octavian (Augustus) to 
celebrate bringing pax to Rome by his victory in a civil war.
Peace brought about through conquest has conventionally been considered 
to capture the sense of pax as the Romans used it, at least under the empire 
established by the successors of Augustus. Myles Lavan, however, offers a close 
examination of the ways in which pax and its derivatives are used by Roman 
authors and proposes a more nuanced understanding in which ‘pacification’ 
of territory is not to be taken as merely a euphemism for violent subjugation 
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but refers rather to the desired end of peaceful coexistence, however it may 
be achieved. Peoples and territories described by Latin authors as pacatus thus 
need not have been forcibly reduced to this state; although Lavan notes that 
the language is not therefore wholly benign, as it grants to Roman imperial 
expansion a purpose of promoting peace which might compare to modern 
projects of establishing ‘civilisation’. This part of the volume then concludes 
by examining an ideology of peace which represented a contemporary chal-
lenge to Roman norms and which has had no less of a modern resonance: that 
put forward by the early Christians, whose views are examined here by David 
M. Gwynn. The beatitudes in the Gospel of Matthew famously praise ‘the 
peacemakers’ who ‘will be called children of God’, but although the authors 
of the New Testament persistently advocate peace and love, they also evince 
a recognition that their religious commitments would meet with and perhaps 
even justify violence.21 The history of early Christianity is thus bound up with 
the encounter between an ideal of peace and a reality in which Christians 
were first targets of persecution and then, unexpectedly, potential agents 
of a new imperial regime which was no more pacific than its predecessors. 
Christian leaders and authors were thus obliged to examine very closely their 
commitment to peace in theory and its practical implications: and as Gwynn 
reminds us, the results provide a legacy of firm and principled opposition to 
military ventures but also a precedent for religious coercion and the begin-
nings of ‘just war’ theory.
The second part of the volume then takes up more practical concerns in 
addressing conflict resolution in classical antiquity, above all between states 
and other political communities and their leaders. It therefore takes its cue 
from a major strand of modern conflict resolution that treats it as part of the 
study of international relations, very often focusing on political strategies and 
formal agreements.22 In the ancient world, however, in the absence of the 
modern system of nation-states and intergovernmental organisations such as 
the United Nations or NATO, peace was as likely to be imposed as negoti-
ated between independent political actors.23 The range of possibilities in such 
circumstances is seen in the contrast drawn by Selga Medenieks between the 
Neo-Assyrian kings, whose conquests regularly ended in the complete subjec-
tion of the defeated party to the new ruler and to his gods, and the innovative 
approach adopted by their successor Cyrus the Great, whose self-representation 
in victory dwelt instead on the peace and good order he claimed to have 
brought to his empire. The arrangements for peace put in place by Cyrus 
seem to have allowed for the worship of other gods alongside or in association 
with his own, an integrative approach that secured his subsequent reputation 
for cultural sensitivity and tolerance and which no doubt did much to recon-
cile his subjects to their subordination.
This policy won Cyrus admirers even in the ancient Greek world, in which 
we are accustomed to see imperial powers rejected as enemies of a jealously 
guarded political independence. But freedom and self-determination could lead 
to difficulties of its own when it came to resolving disputes, not least of which 
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was the difficulty of reaching an agreement that could be accepted by all parties 
as fair. As Aideen Carty demonstrates in her analysis of international arbitration 
in archaic Greece, it was not uncommon for states to submit themselves to the 
judgement of an aisymnetes, a term that Aristotle would later use to describe an 
‘elected tyrant’ but that seems to have connoted a broader capacity to impose 
binding judgements on those who had abandoned hope of resolving conflicts 
any other way. Such a system was workable for as long as there were eminent 
individuals whose independence could be sufficiently guaranteed, and for as 
long as their decisions could be expected to be carried out without too much 
protest from the communities involved. These were conditions less often to 
be found in classical Greece, and Andrew J. Bayliss portrays Sparta in its fifth- 
and fourth-century heyday as participating instead in a complex diplomatic 
environment in which they sought to balance an insistence on legalism with 
actions and policies which can easily be recognised as self-serving. As Bayliss 
points out, Sparta’s relations with those allies bound to her by oaths were often 
conditioned by a desire to maximise her own self-interest; but they were justi-
fied not by appeals to realism but to a language of justice and piety. Modern 
parallels may perhaps come to mind.
If relations between classical Greek states are the period of ancient his-
tory most recognisable as a precursor of the modern system of international 
relations, the rise of Macedon presented it with a return to the dominance 
of a single power and a leader who might be figured either as a tyrant or 
as a benevolent ruler in the mould of Cyrus the Great. Philip of Macedon, 
whose son Alexander is said to have venerated Cyrus, seems to have repre-
sented himself in terms similar to the Persian king in seeking to move from 
enemy and conqueror to an accepted governor of the formerly free Greek 
states. Eoghan Moloney suggests that Philip’s efforts were a serious attempt 
to establish an effective and lasting peace on the basis of the panhellenic 
(or nearly so) League of Corinth; but notes too that his seemingly idealistic 
approach was limited to outcomes that preserved his own hegemony over 
the Greek world, and that Philip was more than ready to abandon efforts 
at integration if pragmatism demanded it. Nevertheless, Philip’s rhetoric is 
a reminder that even the most powerful states in the ancient world had to 
take account of the people they governed: a lesson learned also by Rome, 
as it intervened first in the Greek world and then came to dominate the 
Mediterranean Sea and beyond.
The final two contributions in this part discuss the treatment of conquered 
peoples by the Romans, and similarly demonstrate that even a hegemonic 
power could find itself restricted in the settlements it might impose. John 
Richardson provides a close analysis of an inscription from Spain from the 
second century bc, recording an agreement between a local population and 
their Roman conquerors. Richardson notes that although the text records a 
deditio, the surrender or capitulation of the provincials, the terms offered are 
remarkably generous; and he proposes this as a creative response to a reluc-
tance on the part of the Roman senate to allow commanders in the field to 
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conclude a formal treaty, or foedus. Roman generals were not given free rein 
to make agreements on behalf of the state: those who did so made sure that 
all sides were agreed to present the situation as a Roman triumph and not a 
negotiation.
Nor was this wholly uncharacteristic even of the Roman empire, as John 
Curran suggests in his exploration of the end and aftermath of the Roman 
conquest of Judaea in ad 70. Curran restores to the triumphalist narrative 
insisted on by the Romans themselves a sense of the precariousness of their 
situation as they laid siege to a Jerusalem well built to withstand it; and he 
notes, too, the need for the Roman emperor Vespasian and his family, after 
the war had been won, to allow some leeway to the soldiers who had been 
so long frustrated but also to the Jews themselves. Hence the emperor’s son, 
general and heir apparent, Titus, toured Judaea not only to display Roman 
power but to demonstrate through practical measures the commitment of the 
Romans to ‘winning the peace’; and although the rhetoric on all sides was 
of total destruction, Curran recognises not only the continued Jewish pres-
ence in Jerusalem but also the interest taken by the imperial family in certain 
artefacts and principles of Jewish culture. None of this should diminish the 
horrors of war, nor the frequent ruthlessness of imperial armies. All the same, 
it is a reminder that establishing peace is not merely a matter of ending war.
This point then becomes central to the final part of this volume, which 
takes as its theme the move from conflict resolution to reconciliation. The 
precise nature of this distinction, and even the meaning of ‘reconciliation’ in 
particular, remains disputed in the modern literature, and no formal definition 
has been imposed on the contributors here.24 Nevertheless, there is an emerg-
ing consensus around an understanding of reconciliation in which it applies 
chiefly to individuals involved in a broader conflict and requires adapting 
‘motivations, beliefs, and attitudes’ as a means of accepting and appreciating 
the perspective of other parties.25 This is often presented as a matter of identi-
ties, individual and collective, but it is important to note that this need not 
mean abandonment or even significant weakening of an important identity: 
instead, as Herbert Kelman has suggested, reconciliation need require no more 
than merely ‘acknowledging the validity and legitimacy of the other’s narra-
tive without necessarily fully agreeing with that narrative’.26 Reconciliation 
may thereby be separated from a dedication to truth and justice, which may be 
valuable means to an end but which often relate to objective criteria and not 
subjective experience.27 What is essential is therefore not the basis on which 
peace is achieved but a common commitment to instituting a stable and last-
ing peace: not an end to a particular conflict but a preference for avoiding any 
recourse to violence.28
These principles, and in particular the importance of identity-building as 
a means of reaching a durable peace, are applied by Christoph Ulf to the 
work of the historian Thucydides and his portrayal of attempts to create such 
a common identity among the Greeks of Sicily. Ulf uses the example of the 
Olympian Gods as they are portrayed in Homer and Hesiod to show that a 
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model for a negotiated common identity was available to Thucydides, but finds 
that he was unable or unwilling to apply this to his own day. The vaunted real-
ism of his account of the Peloponnesian War can thus be presented as a failure 
of imagination: the historian lacks the poets’ grasp of the narratives by which 
the warring parties might have been reconciled.
The hope of reconciliation flowers most strongly perhaps in the aftermath 
of violent conflict, and Janett Morgan’s contribution to this volume examines 
the evidence that it was one of the motivating factors behind major building 
projects in antiquity, including the Parthenon in Athens and the monumental 
Achaemenid cities of Pasargadae and Persepolis. Despite the peaceful repu-
tation of Cyrus the Great and the symbolic value of the Parthenon and its 
frieze recalling the Panathenaic festival, Morgan remains sceptical that such 
immense projects reflect the institution of a lasting peace or the reconciliation 
of rival communities. On the contrary, she concludes that they as naturally 
reflect competition and division, with buildings offering rival philanthropists 
a means of establishing or displaying their political and economic power. 
A similar perpetuation of enmity in the guise of a generous accord is then 
recognised by Mike Edwards in the amnesty agreement by which the demo-
crats of Athens were ostensibly reconciled with the Thirty Tyrants who had 
previously dominated the city – an agreement that contained a famous clause 
that none should recall past wrongs. Edwards offers modifications to a recent 
view of the document as in places unexpectedly harsh; but ultimately agrees 
that this amnesty, such as it was, could scarcely be enforced, and indeed that 
the memory of the Thirty had lost little of its motive power even two or 
three generations later.
Once again, it seems that a conditional commitment to eirene and an ina-
bility to see past traditional rivalries limited the prospects of a lasting peace 
in the classical Greek world, as elsewhere. This is also the diagnosis offered 
by Joseph Jansen, who presents the versatile Athenian writer Xenophon as 
an exception: a rare classical thinker who could look beyond civic and 
‘panhellenic’ loyalties to come up with practical proposals for a more stable 
system of interstate relations. The vision of political and economic interde-
pendence that Jansen finds in Xenophon’s Poroi might have brought an end 
to the strife that characterised inter-state relations in classical Greece; but it 
should be noted that what was on offer in the Poroi was arguably no more 
than a lasting truce. Rather than anticipating any real change in the attitudes 
of individuals, Xenophon envisaged a remarkably modern (and limited) state 
of peace based on common economic interests, and preserved for Athens the 
right to use force in defence of those interests – including the use of slaves 
in its silver mines – when these appeared to be under threat. The language 
of unity and friendship here again gives way when closely examined: the 
temporary peace and security provided by trade relations seems likely to have 
been vulnerable when put under pressure.
But if reconciliation on the level of interstate relations seems constantly 
to run up against the constraints of realism, there is a case for examining the 
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prospects for reconciliation among individuals and on ideological grounds. 
The early Christians, whose commitment to an ideal of peace has already been 
emphasised, encountered with the advent of state support not only the need 
to engage with the political authorities but also to reach some agreement with 
those co-religionists whose loyalties did not wholly coincide with their own. 
The frequently violent disagreements that resulted from questions of heresy 
and schism have rarely been seen as redounding to the credit of those involved, 
and it seems clear that ‘the peace of the church’ was achieved in large part by 
the forcible suppression of dissent. This picture is not entirely to be rejected, 
although it has more recently been suggested that accusations of violence on 
all sides may well be exaggerated.29 Hence, Peter Iver Kaufman looks closely at 
the view offered by the bishop and theologian Augustine of Hippo regarding 
what he would condemn as the heresy of Donatism, and finds that although he 
was by no means reluctant to employ the state machinery of punishment and 
repression to alter the allegiances of these malcontents, Augustine at least in 
principle balanced this with a consistent rhetorical emphasis on repentance and, 
perhaps ultimately, reconciliation. Similarly, Michael Stuart Williams picks out 
instances from late antiquity to suggest that even in a matter so unamenable 
to compromise as Christian heresy and schism, and even in texts that seem 
designed to portray the utter subjugation of an opponent, there remains the 
possibility of reconciliation at least in the mind of the reader. The confidence 
with which the opponents of the ‘orthodox’ figures in these texts are able to 
press their case may be taken, in the terms set out by Kelman, as a recognition 
of the validity of a rival position – even if no acceptance of it is urged. In both 
cases it must be noted that reconciliation was only on the terms of the winners: 
there was little room for compromise in matters of faith. But if this prospect 
falls short of an ideally multilateral agreement bought into from all sides, it 
may at least offer an example of peace – imposed, as so often, by a force from 
outside – which nevertheless aspired to a real alteration of hearts and minds.
Each of the contributions to this volume examines an individual case, and it is 
inevitable that concerns should overlap; and indeed that each in its own way 
should have dealt with all three significant themes of peace, conflict resolution 
and reconciliation. These divisions are for the sake of convenience, and to 
point up connections that might otherwise be overlooked. At the same time, 
of course, a number of these contributions might have slotted in nicely else-
where in the volume, and it seems more an advantage than a disadvantage that 
themes should recur in widely separated essays. Each author has employed his 
or her own terms, and each has had the freedom to choose whether or not to 
engage with the discourse of modern peace studies and/or with the modern 
world. Even where such parallels are not explicitly drawn, however, it is to be 
hoped that the relevance of the study of peace in so many aspects has some-
thing to offer to those who may not be specialists in the classical world, as well 
as showing those who are already familiar with that world that there are aspects 
which are easily overlooked.
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Naturally, there remain many notable gaps in the coverage provided by 
the contributions to this volume. This project had its origin in a panel 
organised by the editors as part of the Celtic Conference in Classics held 
in Edinburgh in August 2014; and some papers delivered on that occa-
sion could not, for any number of good reasons, in the end be provided or 
included. Other contributions were commissioned for this volume where 
obvious gaps or missing perspectives were identified, and where appropri-
ate expertise was available. Nevertheless, in a volume of this nature there 
can be no pretence of providing comprehensive coverage of such a wide-
ranging topic, and where there are omissions it must be left to other scholars 
to recognise them and to make good the deficiency. It remains only for 
the editors to thank the participants in this project: the contributors to this 
volume, including those who were asked to write specially for it; those who 
spoke at the original conference panel, and those who chaired panels at that 
event and who came to listen and discuss the various issues; the organisers 
of the conference as a whole, Douglas Cairns and Anton Powell; the anony-
mous readers provided by the publisher, who took pains to offer careful and 
sympathetic feedback; and Michael Greenwood himself and all at Ashgate 
for their consistent support and attention to detail. Thanks to all of these, 
you now hold in your hands a collection of papers which may not promise 
peace in our time, but which may allow a greater understanding of how the 
classical world imagined, established and instituted something resembling 
peace in their time.
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11 For example, Badian (1987); Cawkwell (1997); and the articles in De Souza and France 
(2008).
12 The discussion of Thucydides and the causes of war is too broad for more than one or 
two emblematic works to be cited: these might range from Sealey (1957) and Andrewes 
(1959) to Lebow (1991) and Parmeggiani (2007). Kagan (1995) incorporates the ques-
tion into an even broader comparative study; it may be noted that Evangelista (2005) 
devotes an entire volume to modern studies of the causes of wars.
13 Raaflaub (2007a); note also Dülffer and Frank (2009) where we have a tripartite split 
between peace, war, and gender. Evangelista (2005) 11 notes the paradox that ‘most 
scholars of peace studies spend their time studying conflict and war’; the extent to which 
this is an essential feature of the discipline is examined in Gleditsch, Nordkveller and 
Strand (2014).
14 Offering here a wider review, for example, than those recent collections edited by 
Rocchi (2007) and Wilker (2012a).
15 Galtung (1969), (1990): see e.g. the application of this approach to the ancient world in 
Praet (2014).
16 Müller (2003) 57.
17 Müller (2003) 63.
18 Thus Deutsch (2006) offers various examples of conflict from the interpersonal to the 
international as his introduction to a study not of peace in the broadest sense but of the 
related idea of ‘conflict resolution’.
19 Ishida (1969) 137 insists on the importance of understanding peace in cross-cultural 
terms; his account of the meanings of these ancient terms is of course limited by the 
scope of his wider project.
20 Enright (1986) 110.
21 Matt. 5.3–10.
22 See e.g. Hauss (2010); the more interpersonal approach adopted in Deutsch et al. (2006) 
and which becomes dominant in the 2014 third edition is not easy to apply to the 
ancient world, given the paucity of evidence about ordinary individual actors; neverthe-
less, elements of this approach may be found in the third part of this volume, defined here 
as dealing with ‘reconciliation’.
23 On the use of ideologies of peace to justify hegemonic power, in ancient and modern 
times, see Parchami (2009).
24 See Bloomfield (2006) for an intelligent survey of the various meanings of reconciliation.
12 E. P. Moloney and Michael Stuart Williams
25 Bar-Tal and Bernink (2004) 11; this seems compatible with the various definitions 
put forward in De Gruchy (2002) ‘a fundamental shift in personal and power rela-
tions’ (25) and Hauss (2003) ‘to lead individual men and women to change the way 
they think about their historical adversaries’.
26 Kelman (2010) 4.
27 Kelman (2010) 6.
28 This sense of reconciliation thus relates to the idea of a ‘stable peace’ as set out in 
Boulding (1987), as well as conforming in some ways to the definition of peace at Müller 
(2003) 62, which places an emphasis on the durability of peace and the disavowal of ‘the 
possible use of violence by one against another’.
29 See especially the overview of recent research in Bremmer (2014).
